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Abstract
This paper, prepared for UNCTAD’s initiative on responsible sovereign lending
and borrowing, considers concrete strategies for implementing the Principles.
It draws on studies in soft law and new governance, and on the recent
experience in promoting best practices in international finance, including
project finance, extraction revenue management, foreign aid, sovereign
investment, and sovereign borrowing in the capital markets. It recommends
maintaining the current non-binding character of the Principles, while
embedding implementation in multi-stakeholder arrangements for ongoing
disclosure, assessment, interpretation, and adaptation. This strategy has the
best chance of changing behavior in sovereign lending and borrowing by
creating constituencies for implementation and sustained compliance.
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Introduction
Sovereign debt exists in a sparse legal space. Debt contract enforcement is uncertain.1
There are no formal bankruptcy procedures to guide debt adjustment in distress, and
create incentives for sound debt management in bankruptcy’s shadow.2 Informal
restructuring procedures are entrenched and well-known in a narrow circle of repeat
players, but scattered across legal regimes and unintelligible to the public. National
1

Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, Debt With Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 48 Rev. Econ.
Stud. 289 (1981).
2
Patrick Bolton & David A. Skeel, Jr., Inside the Black Box: How Should a Sovereign Bankruptcy Framework Be
Structured?, 53 Emory L.J. 763 (2004).

2

Hard, Soft, and Embedded: Implementing Principles

regulation, ubiquitous in other areas of finance, is limited at best in sovereign debt,
where market participants are presumed to be sophisticated and in no need of
protection. Treaty-based institutions for rulemaking and adjudication, so salient in
trade, are lacking in finance.3 Elsewhere in finance, transnational regulatory
coordination has sought to fill the gaps in the formal treaty fabric; however, even as it
has grown in the wake of financial crises, the regulatory machinery has bypassed
sovereign debt. There are good reasons for excluding sovereign debt from each of these
regulatory domains; however, the resulting regime is fraught with bad incentives and
destructive outcomes.
Agency problems, time inconsistency, information asymmetries and moral hazard are
perennial risks in sovereign lending and borrowing. Public officials borrow in the name
of the people, but not in their interest.4 Future generations are saddled with
unsustainable debts. Disclosure is faulty, particularly when it comes to contingent
liabilities of the sovereign.5 Lenders who expect to be rescued by third-country
taxpayers—or to be repaid before others of equal rank—keep credit flowing to insolvent
debtors.6 When default comes, its worst effects fall on innocent bystanders, populations
and future generations that had no say the borrowing decisions. Banking, currency, and
political crises go hand in hand with sovereign debt default.7
The Principles on Promoting Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing
(“Principles”) contribute to filling the legal and institutional void in three ways. First,
they attempt to generalize and systematize from the law and practice of sovereign debt,
to propose a unified normative framework for law-making in this area. Second, the
Principles initiative aims to diffuse this knowledge, and broaden the consensus around
what constitutes responsible behavior in sovereign finance. Third, the Principles engage
diverse stakeholders to create constituencies for responsible practices.
Successful implementation of the Principles should result in a durable change of
behavior among sovereign borrowers and their lenders. The goal is not a change in the
law, but a shift in economic and social outcomes. Formal law reform can help, but is
neither necessary nor sufficient to bring about such a shift.
3

Chris Brummer, Why Soft Law Dominates International Finance—and not Trade 13 J.Int’l Econ.L. 623 (Oct. 2010).
Symposium, Odious Debts and State Corruption, 70 Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer 2007, at 1, 70 Law & Contemp.
Probs., Autumn 2007, at 1; Symposium, 32 N.C. J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 605 (2007).
5
Lee C. Buchheit & Mitu Gulati, Restructuring a Sovereign’s Contingent Liabilities (UNCTAD Working Paper, 2012).
6
Patrick Bolton & David A. Skeel, Jr., Inside the Black Box: How Should a Sovereign Bankruptcy Framework Be
Structured?, 53 Emory L.J. 763 (2004).
7
CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY (2009).
4
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Four core characteristics of the Principles enhance the prospects of implementation
defined in this way. First, the Principles do not claim to make new law, but rather to
harness and elaborate existing best practices and general principles.8 Even where this
claim has been questioned, the task of the Principles is one of adaptation, not
invention.9 The core values and methods of the Principles are well-established in
national legal systems.10 This should minimize the need for formal changes in national
law, and the associated political and procedural obstacles to implementation.
Second, the Principles aspire to be comprehensive, inclusive and even-handed: they
address both debtor and creditor practices and both public and private creditors across
a broad range of instruments. They also contemplate an active role for civil society
stakeholders. Other recent efforts to promote responsibility in international finance
have focused on discrete sectors, practices, constituencies, and forms of finance.11
Partial regimes pose a greater risk of inequitable regulation and regulatory arbitrage.
The Principles’ ambitious reach promises to boost legitimacy and dissuade arbitrage in
regulatory outcomes. By integrating diverse interests in a common program, the
Principles also suggest input legitimacy, which should contribute to effective
implementation.
Third, the process of drafting the Principles is another source of input legitimacy. They
are a product of broad-based consultations with diverse governments, multilateral
institutions, civil society groups, market associations, and legal and economic experts.
Maintaining these links as the content of the Principles is elaborated and specified
should enhance buy-in among the actors ultimately responsible for implementation.
Fourth, by improving risk management and accountability in sovereign finance, the
Principles should become a force for financial stability. They contribute to crisis
prevention by focusing on due diligence, transparency, and clear lines of authority ex
ante. The Principles should improve the handling of sovereign debt distress by
identifying the locus and standards of responsibility ex post. The Principles’ emphasis on
disclosure should facilitate constructive operation of market mechanisms at all stages of
sovereign debt management. Together, these features contribute to the output
legitimacy of the Principles, which should build support for sustained implementation
and diffusion.

8

Principles; Esposito & Bohoslavsky (2012).
Matthias Goldmann, Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing: The View from Domestic Jurisdictions (UNCTAD
Working Paper, 2012).
10
Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati & Robert B. Thompson, The Dilemma of Odious Debts, 56 Duke L.J. 1201 (2007).
11
See Part II infra.
9
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Mindful of these strengths, I propose a three-prong implementation strategy: locking in
the gains, establishing foundations for institutionalization, and building enduring
constituencies for implementation.
The first prong of the strategy requires locking in the gains already embodied in the
Principles, with public endorsement by key groups of stakeholders: states, civil society
groups, and market participants. This can be done without altering the soft law
character of the Principles. At the outset, it is important to cement and broaden public
“buy-in” for the essential goals and core values of the Principles. Without a signal of
broad-based ownership, the initiative may come to be portrayed as ineffectual or
partisan. A diverse group of endorsers defines the Principles’ ambitious constituency,
and demonstrates demand for regulation12 in this area.
In contrast, attempting to negotiate a formal treaty based on the Principles is both
infeasible and undesirable at this stage. It is infeasible because treaty negotiation and
ratification would take many years—putting off the task of implementation into the far
future—and might result in weaker substantive commitments.13 The treaty form cannot
bind nonstate actors, such as private creditors, except by the consent of their states.14
As a result, a treaty may detract from the horizontal, multi-stakeholder character of the
Principles that is their principal strength. No alternative formal commitment vehicle is
available to bind diverse public and private actors under international law. Even if it
were possible, formalization may be undesirable at this stage. It would risk freezing the
current limited consensus and stymie further development of the Principles to reflect
rapid changes in the financial markets and political participation.15 Paradoxically, early
formalization may weaken the compliance pull of the Principles by shifting resources
away from generating information and improving organizational practices, to

12

Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods, In Whose Benefit? Explaining Regulatory Change in Global Politics, in THE POLITICS OF
GLOBAL REGULATION (Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods, Eds., 2009).
13
For example, work on the Convention on the Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and State
Debts began in 1967. The convention opened for signature in 1983, but is yet to enter into force. See United Nations
Diplomatic Conferences, Convention on the Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives, and state
Debts,
at
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/diplomaticconferences/succ-stateprop-archivesdbt-1983/succ-stateproparchivesdbt-1983.html (last visited February 20, 2012); Economic Aspects of State Succession: Final Report,
International Law Association Toronto Conference (2006).
14
Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation Through Transnational New
Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 501 (2009).
15
Potentially a more flexible “hard law” implementation strategy, which relies on judicial enforcement and the
Principles’ status as general principles of international law, is promising, but risky if pursued in isolation. Unfavorable
court rulings may set back implementation, while a litigation-focused approach would mobilize interest groups and
legal strategies opposed to the Principles. See Matthias Goldmann, Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing: The
View from Domestic Jurisdictions (UNCTAD Working Paper, 2012) and discussion in Part I.A infra.
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sanctioning bad behavior16 in an area where information is scarce, political tensions run
high, and consensus on what constitutes compliance is only emerging.
The second prong of the implementation strategy would leverage support for the
overall approach of the Principles, as evidenced by early endorsements, to begin
institutionalization. Again, this does not require “hard law” or treaty-based
organizations. Instead, the focus should be on designing institutions to supply an open,
accountable regulatory process and mobilizing constituencies to demand disclosure,
monitoring and assessment. Making information on sovereign lending and borrowing
publicly accessible should enhance democratic accountability and market discipline
alike. Creating institutions for monitoring information and fostering competition among
them, can help develop expertise, entrench good practices, and create conditions for
continuous improvement. 17 Put differently, successful implementation of the Principles
requires technology to disseminate information about sovereign lending and borrowing,
and people with the skills and incentives to collect, distribute, and interpret such
information. Both the monitored and the monitors are pushed to do better when there
is a robust information flow, and competition to provide credible and transparent
assessment of the information. Monitoring mechanisms may be stand-alone and brand
new, part of existing public, private or civil society institutions, or a combination.
Third, successful implementation of the Principles requires constituents with a stake in
compliance.18 Constituents can emerge in an iterative process of elaborating and
refining the Principles, and assessing compliance. Interpretation and revision of the
Principles to reflect the evolving economic and political context, as well as
implementation experience, should foster durable “ownership” of the Principles among
different stakeholders. Although interpretation and revision institutions should be
inclusive, they need not be centralized. Decentralization can preserve the space for
generating and contesting ideas19 about regulation of sovereign lending and borrowing,
and also enhance legitimacy. Local, regional, and interest group bodies may be most
effective in channeling different constituents’ concerns, so long as there is an effective
coordination mechanism among them. On the down side, multiple interpretation and
16

(data from environmental regulation suggests that coercive state sanctions weaken compliance with self-regulatory
commitments, but robust regulatory surveillance improves it).
17
Charles Sabel, Dara O’Rourke & Archon Fung, Ratcheting Labor Standards: Regulation for Continuous Improvement
in the Global Workplace, KSG Working Paper No. 00-010; Columbia Law and Economic Working Paper No. 185;
Columbia Law School, Pub. Law Research Paper No. 01-21, May 2000, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=253833
or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.253833.
18
This is related to the concept of demand for regulation; however, constituents can also include “suppliers” such as
rulemaking and monitoring institutions. Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods, In Whose Benefit? Explaining Regulatory
Change in Global Politics, in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION (Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods, Eds., 2009).
19
Id.
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assessment bodies can produce fragmentation and confusion, opening opportunities for
arbitrage. This is an argument for more centralization and even a hierarchy of
interpretation.
Throughout, it is important to consider the relationship of the Principles to the existing
machinery of “hard law”—international organizations, national regulators, national and
international dispute resolution fora, treaties, and contracts—as well as the established
“soft” infrastructure for cooperation, including the G-20 and the FSB.20 Linking the
Principles to existing mechanisms taps into established institutional supply, promote
their institutional embeddedness, and make them part of the fabric of international law
and financial regulation. Whether this leads to a “hardening” of the Principles into
custom, treaty, or other formal and binding law, and to the creation of new formal
institutions, is a question for another day. Implementation need not wait until then.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In Part I, I put the Principles in the
context of sovereign debt governance and international economic regulation. I describe
the work of hard law, soft law, and new governance in sovereign debt. Part II surveys
experience from recent initiatives to govern aspects of the international financial
system, including project finance, extractive industries, foreign aid, sovereign
investment, and capital markets borrowing. I also consider the evolution of anticorruption law from soft initiative to multilateral treaty. Although these experiences
offer valuable lessons, none serves as direct precedent for the Principles. Part III
synthesizes the theoretical literature and the experiences described in Part II to offer
recommendations for implementation.
As the first step, I suggest securing the endorsement of governments, but just as
importantly, market and civil society groups in the run-up to Doha. It is important to
secure endorsements from different regions and parts of the national income spectrum.
These should be unequivocal with respect to the overarching goals and methods of the
Principles, but need neither adopt nor exclude specific principles and their implications.
I recommend simultaneously reaching out to existing public fora, including IMF, FSB, BIS,
and the Paris Club, some of which have been involved in the creation of the Principles,
to explore incorporation in surveillance, technical assistance, and other aspects of their
operations. Trade associations, such as ICMA, SIFMA, and IIF, should be consulted for
endorsement, but also to explore linkages with their best practice guidance and
monitoring mechanisms. National debt management agencies can be tapped to
20

ST

CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULE MAKING IN THE 21 CENTURY (2012).

7

Hard, Soft, and Embedded: Implementing Principles

consider incorporating the Principles in their debt contracts21 and operational practices.
Second, civil society groups, academics, and market participants should be encouraged
to design monitoring and assessment mechanisms and publicize their proposals.22
Finally, I recommend forming a Principles governance body to coordinate disclosure,
monitoring, interpretation and elaboration issues. The body should meet regularly and
report to UNCTAD—which would assume an “orchestration” role in support of informal
regulation23—but also to the public on a dedicated website. Among other tasks, it
should synthesize the compliance metrics developed by civil society, academic, market,
and official participants, promote coordination among constituents, evaluate
implementation, and support the adaptation of the Principles to ensure their continued
relevance.

Part I: Hard Law, Soft Law, and New Governance in Sovereign Debt
A. Hard Law in Sovereign Debt
At this writing, sovereign debt stands at over $40 trillion.24 Considering its size, national
and global importance, and the multitude of diverse international actors in this market,
the apparent dearth and fragmentation of law in it is remarkable. In one sense, this
state of affairs is par for the course in international finance. Scholars often contrast
international finance—governed informally, through coordination networks among
national regulators—and international trade, where formal and binding treaties and

21

See Eric Helleiner, Filling a Hole in Global Financial Governance? The Politics of Regulating Sovereign Debt
Restructuring in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION (Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods, Eds., 2009) (reporting on the
successful reform of boilerplate sovereign debt contracts as an instance of entrepreneurial regulation). But see W.
Mark C. Weidemaier, Reforming Sovereign Lending Practices: Modern Initiatives in Historical Context (Working Paper
2012, suggesting that government efforts to prompt private contract reform have been ineffective or have brought
about unforeseen results).
22
Funding options may need to be considered to encourage effective civil society input.
23
Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation Through Transnational New
Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 501 (2009) (describing the orchestration
function and “orchestration deficit” in transnational governance).
24
Estimate based on BIS Securities Statistics, December 2011, Tables 12D (September 2011), 16A (June 2011) and
Joint External Debt Hub data. The vast majority of this debt comprises domestic instruments issued by wealthy states
in the capital markets. External debts owed by low and middle-income countries, and debts owed to bilateral and
multilateral lenders, account for a small part of the total. In recent years, the boundaries between domestic and
external debts, public and private creditors, have blurred: foreign residents participate in domestic debt markets, and
central banks and sovereign investment funds are important creditors to foreign governments.
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institutional structures of the World Trade Organization prevail.25 But sovereign debt is
exceptional even within international finance.
Private financial institutions and capital markets are subject to formal regulation at the
national level, coordinated in fora such as the Basel Committee for Bank Supervision,
and more recently, the Financial Stability Board. Market participants’ contracts are
routinely enforced in domestic courts. When they become insolvent, most can avail
themselves of statutory bankruptcy or resolution procedures, which in turn create
incentives for debt management in good times.
Virtually none of these features are present in sovereign debt. Sovereign immunity and
the difficulty of reaching sovereign assets make debt contract enforcement
unpredictable.26 Some countries refuse to abide by repayment promises – yet others are
forced to repay when they cannot and should not.27 There is no bankruptcy procedure
for sovereigns.28 Debt adjustment takes place in a constellation of informal processes
dominated by elite insiders, as discussed in more detail in the next section. From
regulators’ perspective, sovereign debt markets are generally the province of
sophisticated issuers and investors, who need little by way of consumer protection.29 As
a result, sovereign debt is not just a zone where treaties, custom, and adjudication30 are
rare—it appears to be a law-free zone.
To be sure, most countries have laws and institutions governing their own debt
issuance; courts do occasionally rule on foreign sovereign debt contract disputes; and
25

See e.g., Chris Brummer, Why Soft Law Dominates International Finance—and not Trade 13 J.Int’l Econ.L. 623 (Oct.
2010).
26
The immunity is codified in many jurisdictions, including the United States and the United Kingdom. Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2006); State Immunity Act 1978, 1978 Chapter 33, available
at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1978/33. This enforcement challenge is at the heart of economic theories
about sovereign debt. See Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, Debt With Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and
Empirical Analysis, 48 Rev. Econ. Stud. 289 (1981); see also FEDERICO STURZENEGGER & JEROMIN ZETTELMEYER, DEBT DEFAULTS
AND LESSONS FROM A DECADE OF CRISES 31-47 (2007) (summarizing the literature). Litigation in the wake of Argentina’s
2001 default is illustrative: the only creditor attachment came nearly a decade after the initial default, and involved
obscure debates about trust law. EM, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, NML, Ltd., v. Republic of Argentina, 2009 WL
2568433 (August 18, 2009), EM, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 389 Fed. Appx. 38 (2d Cir., August 3, 2010), cert. denied
131 S.Ct. 1474 (February 22, 2011). See also Alison Frankel, U.S. Walks Dangerous Line to Support Argentina in Bond
Cases, Thompson Reuters, Apr. 9, 2012, available at http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/
2012/04_-_April/U_S__walks_dangerous_line_to_support_Argentina_in_bond_cases/ (U.S. position in the latest
round of creditor lawsuits against Argentina undermines already weak sovereign debt enforcement).
27
See e.g., Donegal Int’l Limited v. Republic of Zambia [2007] EWHC197 (Comm).
28
For an account of the most recent attempt to establish a statutory sovereign bankruptcy regime, see Sean Hagan,
Designing a Legal Framework To Restructure Sovereign Debt, 36 Geo. J. Int’l L. 299.
29
Cases where retail investors are a big factor are rare – Argentina’s default in 2001 was exceptional for involving
numerous retail investors in Italy.
30
For the widely accepted statement of the sources of “hard” law, see Statute of the International Court of Justice
art. 38, Oct. 24, 1945, 832 U.S.T.S.
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some national laws attempt to influence foreign sovereign debt practices.31 There have
been treaty initiatives to govern aspects of the market.32 The steady evolution of
sovereign immunity doctrines and, at the other end of the spectrum, the recentlyrevived debate about Odious Debt, testify to the potential of customary international
law in this area.33 However, such examples stand out as exceptions: they are few, and
have a limited or contested record of implementation.
Scholars have considered why formal and binding international law plays such a limited
role in international finance.34 Some of their explanations apply to sovereign debt.
Treaties take a long time to negotiate; may be diluted outright and through piecemeal
reservations; and are hard to amend—though amenable to exit.35 They seem ill-suited
for a field characterized by the speed of technological and financial innovation. 36 By
some accounts, customary international law is even more problematic for its
combination of uncertainty and inflexibility. Custom can take a long time to emerge; the
precise content and moment of its emergence are uncertain; and changing or opting out
of custom is even harder than changing treaties.37 None of these reasons would rule out
recourse to treaties and custom as means of implementing the Principles, but at a
minimum, they suggest caution in relying on these mechanisms as principal vehicles for
implementation.
Different concerns apply to another potential avenue for hard international law:
locating responsible lending and borrowing in “the general principles of law recognized
by civilized nations.”38 Where such shared principles apply, courts are bound by them as
by other sources of international law. Extrapolating to Principles implementation, to the
extent they are found to reflect widely accepted domestic law, courts may be asked to
apply them as such. As a source of hard sovereign debt law, general principles raise
three challenges: identification, fragmentation, and constituency-building. Identifying
31

See e.g., the UK Debt Relief (Developing Countries) Act 2010, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/2010/22/contents.
32
UNCTAD initiatives in the 1960s and 1970s are a prominent example. For a description, see LEX RIEFFEL, RESTRUCTURING
SOVEREIGN DEBT: THE CASE FOR AD HOC MACHINERY 132-148 (2003); see also Hagan, supra note 23.
33
SABINE MICHALOWSKI, UNCONSTITUTIONAL REGIMES AND THE VALIDITY OF SOVEREIGN DEBT: A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 33-96 (2007)
34
For a comprehensive account of the soft governance of international finance, see Chris Brummer, Soft Law and
st
Global Financial System: Rule Making in the 21 Century (2012); for a critique of the predominant explanations of the
softness, see Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Why Regulate International Finance? (Working Paper 2012).
35
Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties 91 VA L. Rev. 1579 (2005).
36
Roberta S. Karmel & Claire R. Kelly, The Hardening of Soft Law in Securities Regulation, 34 Brook.J.Int’lL., 883, 885
(2009).
37
Curtis Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Opting Out of Custom 120 Yale L. J. 202 (2010); Andrew Guzman, Saving Customary
International Law, 27 Mich. J. of Int’l L. 115 (2005).
38
Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(c), Oct. 24, 1945, 832 U.S.T.S. Similarly, the Restatement of
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Third) (1987), Sec. 102, refers to “[g]eneral principles common to the
major legal systems.” See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 98-105 (2008); Armin von Bogdandy, General Principles
of International Public Authority: Sketching a Research Field, 9 German L. J. 1909 (2008).
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general principles can become a complex inquiry of comparative law. Where the inquiry
is inconclusive or jurisdictions differ, courts may shy away from applying the law, or may
apply it narrowly.39 An academic study of fifteen jurisdictions undertaken in connection
with Principles implementation concludes that while many of the Principles are
generally accepted, others reflect and adapt current trends.40It follows that an
implementation argument based on general principles would be more successful with
respect to some of the Principles than others, and in some courts more than in others,
potentially contributing to the fragmentation of sovereign debt law. Finally, governing
sovereign debt from “hard” general principles relies importantly on litigation. In this
context, some powerful interest groups will invest in legal strategies against hardening
standards of responsibility. At a minimum, if such groups are also involved in the multistakeholder implementation strategies discussed in Part III, they may find it more
difficult to litigate in opposition.
Finally, hard law faces structural fit problems in sovereign finance, most of which is built
on horizontal contracting between private creditors and states as market participants.
While national law may face enforcement constraints when applied to sovereigns, hard
international law does not comprehend states and nonstate actors in a horizontal
relationship. A state may enter into a treaty to bind itself and its subjects; industry and
NGO representatives may influence a state’s position in treaty negotiations; states may
even establish hybrid tribunals;41 however, in all these arrangements, nonstate
participants enter indirectly and courtesy of their states.
The dearth of hard law in sovereign debt may have an optimistic explanation: the
current constellation of formal institutions and informal practices, including the IMF, the
World Bank, and the Paris Club, described in the next section, do a fine job of managing
the space. A more skeptical view might be that the informal and ad-hoc approach
maximizes policy flexibility for the strongest private and state creditors at the expense
of weaker actors.42

39

Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, Law in the Heart of Darkness: Atrocity and Duress, 43 VA J. Int’l L. 861 (2003) (discussing
judicial treatment of general principles in a case where a survey of fifteen jurisdictions determined that civil and
common law jurisdictions differed); see also Judgment, Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A (I.C.T.Y., Appeals
Chamber, Oct. 7, 1997), available at http://www.un.org/icty/erdemovic/appeal/judgement/erd-aj971007e.htm .
40
Matthias Goldmann, Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing: The View from Domestic Jurisdictions (UNCTAD
Working Paper, 2012). Most of the general principles concerned were not limited to sovereign debt, but rather debt
and financial responsibility more broadly.
41
The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes is an example. www.icsid.worldbank.org.
42
See Eric Helleiner, Filling a Hole in Global Financial Governance? The Politics of Regulating Sovereign Debt
Restructuring in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION (Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods, Eds., 2009) (describing how NGOs
were outmaneuvered by creditor groups and creditor country governments). Compare Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Why
Regulate International Finance? (Working Paper 2012).
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In sum, the role of formal domestic and international law in the sovereign space is
limited. Even if it were easy to negotiate a treaty or spur the formation of custom in this
field, it is likely to be an awkward fit. Relying solely on general principles of law in
sovereign debt may contribute to fragmentation, and mobilize litigation strategies
against standards of responsibility. The next two sections investigate soft law and new
governance approaches to sovereign debt.

B. Soft Law in Sovereign Debt and International Financial Regulation
Soft law hovers between hard law and aspiration. Although definitions abound, most
focus on the absence or weakness of legal obligation, and on informality.43 For some
international law scholars, soft law hardly adds up to law at all.44 Others appreciate its
capacity to secure compliance by other means, and suggest that it may be as good as
hard law in most pertinent respects—at least in international finance.45 Examples of soft
law in international finance range from high level commitments of the G-7 and the G-20,
to the rulemaking of the Basel Committee and the Financial Stability Board. None is
formally binding, each exerts compliance pull.
In sovereign debt, the role of soft law is readily apparent in the prevailing system for
dealing with debt distress. Traditionally, a country that has trouble paying its foreign
debts might approach the IMF for financing. In most cases, such financing would be
conditional on implementation of economic reforms, designed among other things to
ensure that the Fund is repaid. The resulting economic program would include an
assessment of debt sustainability and financing need during the program period. To fill
the “financing gap,” the country would next go to the Paris Club, where creditor states
will negotiate relief of bilateral debts, usually based on one of a menu of formulas. They
would then send the country to obtain “comparable” terms from other creditors,
including private commercial banks and bondholders.46
Figure 1 is a stylized representation of the external sovereign debt restructuring process.
Bordered shapes stand for entities with legal personality under domestic or
international law. Although the protagonists in the process are states, international
organizations, and firms, the process itself—in the middle row—is overwhelmingly soft.
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The Paris Club and the London Club are informal coordination mechanisms with no legal
personality. They mediate between the sovereign and its creditors. The Paris Club
emerged as a forum for official bilateral creditors in the mid-1950s; it meets regularly at
the French finance ministry to negotiate debt restructuring terms for government-togovernment debt. Although its procedures and outcomes are quite regimented, the
Paris Club has no charter and no personality under domestic or international law, and
has only recently launched a website.47 The London Club is even less formal. The term
refers to a system of bank advisory committees that renegotiated syndicated loan
contracts with low and middle-income sovereigns during the debt crisis of the 1980s.
Although the workings of the London Club, like the Paris Club, are reasonably
predictable, it has no permanent home, secretariat, or website.48 The bond
restructuring “nonsystem” came to the forefront of sovereign debt management in the
1990s. Although it features a certain repertoire of restructuring tools,49 the system lacks
the institutional structure of the other fora. It is essentially a subset of capital markets
transactions. Multilateral creditors traditionally have been excluded from restructuring,
47

The timing is ironic: the Paris Club became more transparent just as its relevance in international debt matters was
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though they have scrupulously avoided claiming formal preference.50 Initiatives for poor
heavily indebted countries launched in the late 1990s are a partial exception to this
treatment.
The sovereign debt restructuring process is routinized and well-known to countries and
institutions that participate (many repeatedly), financial firms active in the sovereign
debt market, and a tight-knit cadre of lawyers in New York and London. However, to the
outsider—including citizens of debtor and creditor countries—it is largely unknown,
unintelligible, and potentially illegitimate. The system is hierarchical51 and far from
comprehensive. Already convoluted, Figure 1 would become hopelessly cluttered if
regional authorities, trade creditors, suppliers, and domestic creditors—all of whose
claims are addressed separately—were added in.
The record of this system in delivering debt relief, and more importantly, fostering
responsible borrowing and lending ex ante, is vigorously contested. Some writers point
to the dozens of cases where countries obtained deep debt relief without formal
bankruptcy procedures as prima facie evidence of success. Yet others focus on the
inadequate volume and slow provision of relief, and the persistence of problematic debt
accumulation as evidence of system failure. Like most soft law systems, sovereign debt
restructuring has shown flexibility over time—visible in the evolution of Paris Club
membership and terms, the incorporation of bond restructuring techniques, and the
introduction of multilateral debt relief in response to civil society initiatives—however,
it has also suffered from deficits of transparency, democratic accountability, and
efficacy.
It is useful to compare briefly the workings of soft law in sovereign debt and other areas
of international finance. The existing literature on soft law in international finance is
dedicated almost entirely to international financial regulation (IFR). On the whole, the
assessment of soft law’s role in IFR is positive, although the financial crisis has tempered
some of the enthusiasm.52
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Proponents describe soft lawmaking as more expert, flexible, and efficient; more
cooperative and less threatening to regulatory sovereignty than old-style hard law.53
With these advantages, soft law operating through transnational networks has
blossomed, and has begun to develop a record of accomplishment in coordinating
regulatory enforcement and harmonizing certain regulatory standards.54 States adopt
and implement the strictures of Basel capital accords, collaborate in enforcing securities
laws, and fight money laundering even though (or precisely because) no one forced
them to. In this telling, networks of similarly minded regulators55 have succeeded where
generations of diplomats have come up short.
This joyful take on transnational regulation has always had its critics, and has come
under intense scrutiny in the aftermath of 2008.56 Today’s view of soft law is less
inclined to presume cooperation and community of interest. It allows that national
regulators may seek to promote domestic competitiveness ahead of regulatory
harmony, resist the high domestic costs of adhering to global rules, and may pursue
“mock compliance” to mask substantive divergence.57 The task is to explain what
substantive compliance takes place despite these pressures.58 But even where the
system achieves compliance, problems remain. IFR networks are hardly comprehensive;
IFR’s strengths—decentralization and horizontality—also make it prone to arbitrage and
capture. And the flipside of cooperative epistemic communities of regulators59 is
regulatory “groupthink,” which can magnify and spread individual regulatory errors in
crisis.60 Perhaps most importantly, an informal technocratic system deliberately
insulated from politics is constantly defending its democratic legitimacy.
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Many of these criticisms of IFR parallel criticisms of the soft system for sovereign debt
restructuring earlier in this section. Some scholars of soft law have taken these
shortcomings of IFR as a basis to prescribe hard law. For skeptics, soft law may be
structurally incapable of raising regulatory standards and generating credible
commitments. Soft law works best to promote liberalization and enforcement
cooperation, both of which serve the interests of dominant actors in the global
economy, rich states and large financial firms. Soft law’s dominance of IFR may just be a
byproduct of power politics and regulatory capture.61 If this argument is right, the IFR
experience is a cautionary tale for Principles implementation.
On the other hand, the flaws of soft law are not in themselves a robust argument for
hard law. The alternative to soft law in many instances is not a WTO-style regime, but a
vacuum of legality. If the policy objective is better standards and deeper compliance, it
makes sense to revisit in more detail the mechanics that make soft law bind.
Two broad categories of tools that promote compliance with soft law in IFR hold
promise for Principles implementation. The first of these is disclosure and reporting,
which can be leveraged to enhance reputational sanctions and market discipline.62
Second, institutional linkages can help anchor new and developing soft law in
established legal regimes, soft and hard, domestic and international. The two categories
are complementary; the second may blend soft and hard law approaches. In the first
instance, nonbinding commitments are embedded in monitoring and reporting
procedures. Monitoring and reporting may be linked to more formal surveillance by
existing institutions, such as the IMF, the development banks, and the various
regulatory fora. The initial standards may be refined, elaborated and revised in the
course of periodic surveys of “core principles” and “best practices.” Divergence from the
standards may be subject to hard and soft sanctions, including name-and-shame
strategies, conditionality, market exclusion, and abridgement of membership privileges
in the various fora.63 Although the most potent sanctions may be difficult to invoke and
sustain, their ultimate availability and potential linkages among them exert a measure of
discipline.
61
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In sum, the debate about soft law in IFR is instructive for efforts to reform sovereign
borrowing and lending. Soft law prevails in both fields, along with its collateral benefits
and challenges: flexibility and potential for horizontality, but also uncertainty,
incompleteness, fragmentation, lack of transparency and accountability. While the
parallels between IFR and sovereign debt should not be overstated (for one, sovereign
debt is very thinly regulated), some of the tools that promote compliance in IFR hold
promise for the implementation of the Principles. In the next section, I briefly consider
these tools from the perspective of the literature on new governance, which helps
enrich explanations of their effectiveness.

C. The New Governance Dimension
Contemporary scholarship on soft law in finance is anchored in debates about sources
and compliance in public international law and international relations. Soft law also
plays an important role in the literature on new governance, which emerged in the
1990s as an alternative vision of domestic administrative regulation.64
The core normative insight of new governance is that an open and collaborative
approach to regulation—where subjects participate in lawmaking alongside government
agents—produces better law and improved compliance. In this view, successful
regulation is open-ended, to allow elaboration over time, iterative, to foster information
flow and participatory law-making, and accountable, with all stakeholders responsible
for the outcome.65 “Soft” codes, consultation and monitoring arrangements are
64
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common examples. Regulators might turn to this new approach for a number of
reasons, including substantive conviction, limited public sector resources, or limited
information about the regulated industry. Theory predicts that the approach should
work because the resulting regulation is based on better information, and because
regulatory subjects that help make the law are more likely to follow it.
Despite obvious overlaps, soft law and new governance are distinct. Soft law’s softness
stands in contrast to the formal attributes and binding force of treaties and custom. The
novelty of new governance is in the process, emphasizing public-private collaboration,
adaptive problem-solving, experimentalism, open-endedness, and shared
accountability. Its foil is “command and control” regulation, where governments make
fully articulated static rules, and enforce private actors’ compliance with them. Soft law
can be (but is not necessarily) an instrument of new governance—and new governance
techniques can be important in promoting compliance with soft law. Flexibility,
horizontal and decentralized law-making may be among the by-products and
advantages of softness, but they are not universal, nor essential to its definition.66 For
example, the prevailing regime for sovereign debt restructuring is certainly soft, but
rarely horizontal. In contrast, such characteristics are at the heart of new governance.
Linkages between soft law and hard institutions of the sort described in the preceding
section are prominent in new governance methodology.
The distinct perspectives on accountability in soft law and new governance are
revealing. In soft law, accountability—understood as law-making governments
answering to the people—is a perennial challenge that attends informality and
lawmaking by expert networks. New governance replaces the challenge with the
concept of “decentralized accountability”—open, participatory law-making, where state
and nonstate actors answer to one another. The ideal of legitimacy in new governance
might be one where regulation is accepted as a shared community norm, internalized as
“appropriate and justified” in the absence of top-down authority or sanction67
Legal scholarship in the field tends to be expressly prescriptive: arguing for or against
the adoption of new governance models in lieu of, or to complement, traditional
regulation. Other disciplines put more emphasis on identifying, classifying, and
explaining the proliferation of governance initiatives. Scholars have found examples of
new governance in labour, environmental, healthcare, corporate, criminal, and many
66
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other fields of law. These include stakeholder consultation requirements in rulemaking,
codes of social responsibility, corporate monitors, and regulatory exemptions linked to
internal procedures at private firms. Typologies and histories abound. Some accounts
trace the progressive development of first-, second-, and third-person private
regulation, from voluntary commitments at isolated firms, to industry-wide codes of
conduct, to independent certification regimes.68 Others focus on actors, and the ways in
which they come together to produce and implement regulation. Abbot and Snidal’s
“Governance Triangle” is an elaborate actor-centered representation of new
governance by combinations of states, firms, and NGOs, occupying the triangle’s
vertices.69 In this view, some initiatives emerge from the combined efforts of firms and
states, others from firms and NGOs, yet others from states and NGOs. Some, though not
many, reside in the center of the triangle, channelling all three sets of actors.
The Principles fit comfortably on the new governance spectrum both for the
collaborative process that produced them, as well as for their emphasis on common
interests and non-coercive implementation. On the other hand, they are somewhat
atypical for the literature, because in sovereign borrowing and lending, states appear
first and foremost as transaction participants and regulatory subjects, with little by way
of regulatory background where states traditionally predominate. The ambiguous role
of the states would make the Governance Triangle an uneasy fit.
As a school of thought, new governance claims a large cadre of prominent academics,
and has had a measure of policy influence.70 Yet others have criticized its theories as illdefined. New governance prescriptions, particularly with respect to accountability, have
faced scepticism familiar to students of soft law: putting unelected private actors in
charge of regulation risks regulatory capture by powerful elites, and may undermine
electoral democracy and government capacity.71
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Empirical studies of the effectiveness of new governance are still sparse and
inconclusive.72 This is not surprising for a field that is relatively new, and (depending on
your perspective) either radically heterogeneous or ill-defined. Much of the empirical
research agenda has focused on documenting the phenomenon of the new governance
in regulation. Qualitative studies in particular tend to focus on the informants’
experience of new governance, and are cautious in their efficacy assessments. However,
several go further, to consider the success of new governance schemes in achieving
their stated goals, or to tease out the factors that contribute to the impact of particular
initiatives.
No study finds unqualified success. There is evidence that corporations excel at formal
compliance and new governance rhetoric, with limited or inconsistent effect on their
behaviour.73 However, the same studies find palpable changes in institutional culture
and awareness. Another notable finding is that weak nonstate actors (such as poor
people) may be at a disadvantage in a purely informal governance regime, and need a
hard law backstop to bolster their bargaining position.74
Even so, asking whether new governance “works” may be beside the point: successful or
not, new governance phenomena are pervasive.75 Just as treaties may not be a practical
alternative to soft law, old-style regulation is not always a practical alternative to new
governance.76 For purposes of implementing the Principles, the relevant inquiry would
identify more and less successful strategies for achieving compliance, find ways to link
soft and hard law, and help establish realistic goals.
So far, theory and experience with new forms of regulation suggests that at a minimum,
they help change the way firms talk about responsible behaviour, and the way in which
they interact with civil society and government actors. This affects firm culture and
72
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holds out the potential of changing behaviour.77 Empowering civil society participation
in the regulatory process through fostering awareness and opening access may help
reduce the risk of capture.78 The presence of hard law in the background—notably in
the form of induced competition and information-forcing surveillance, as alternatives to
coercive sanctions79—can help soft law succeed in a new governance framework. This
poses a special challenge for international law making, where hard law is scarce.
Scholars who have considered the problem recommend more active “orchestration”
and capacity-building by international organizations, using tools such as conditionality
and technical assistance.80 The academic literature on new governance also emphasizes
the need for context-specific approaches, and frequent adjustment as the context
evolves and more information becomes available.
***
In Part, I have sought to situate the Principles in the existing legal landscape of sovereign
borrowing and lending, and in the context of theories about soft law and new
governance. In sum, domestic and international “hard law” play a small role in
sovereign debt compared to most other fields. The sovereign debt restructuring regime
is dominated by soft law coordination, fragmented and poorly understood by the public.
This regime in turn creates the incentives for borrowing and lending, which occur “in the
shadow” of restructuring expectations.
Academic writing and experience with soft law and new governance suggest that
informal and nonbinding mechanisms such as the Principles can improve regulation and
compliance in some circumstances. However, they must be properly designed to
minimize the risks of error, capture, and illegitimacy. To get a better sense of the
optimal design features before turning to implementation recommendations, Part II
briefly considers five new governance-style codes in international finance and
development. In conclusion, I review the evolution of anti-corruption law from national
legislation to transnational “soft” governance, and later international treaty. These case
77
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studies, where the actors addressed similar or overlapping problems, will help
contextualize the prescriptions for Principles implementation.

Part II: Ancestors and Analogues
The Principles have no direct precedent, and are in many ways more ambitious than the
existing codes of best practices in international finance: they seek to cover more
instruments and discipline more diverse actors than the initiatives that have come
before; they are also more substantively prescriptive than others in the field. However,
the past decade has produced a wealth of experience with codes and practices, which
together shed light on potentially promising strategies and pitfalls in Principles
implementation. This Part offers a brief survey of five new governance initiatives,
chosen to reflect different aspects of the Principles. All came about within the past
decade, and are notable for their multi-stakeholder approach—especially when
compared to the standards and codes of the 1990s, predominantly devised by the
official sector to improve regulation in low and middle-income countries. The first two
case studies, the Equator Principles and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative,
seek to enhance social and environmental responsibility and promote accountability in
discrete privately financed sectors. In the next two case studies, the Paris Declaration
and the Santiago Principles, the authors and subjects of regulation are states or state
instrumentalities. The final case study is most closely related to the UNCTAD Principles:
the Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring seek to govern
sovereign borrowing and debt restructuring in the capital markets. The later set of
principles targets government debtor and private creditor behavior. In conclusion, I
discuss an earlier experience with anti-corruption initiatives for an illustration of soft
law hardening into international treaty, while maintaining features of new governance.

A. The Equator Principles
The Equator Principles (EPs) are a framework for managing social and environmental
risk from project finance by commercial banks. Adopted in 2003 and substantially
revised in 2006, the EPs reflect a combination of diminished official participation in
large-scale infrastructure in developing countries, sustained NGO advocacy, and a
heightened perception of risk on the part of the banks.
Although they articulate substantive social and environmental sustainability goals, the
ten principles are essentially procedural: they commit banks to require their borrowers
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(project sponsors) to adopt responsible practices, focusing on projects in developing
countries. Participating banks, or Equator Principles Financial Institutions (EPFIs), pledge
to (1) review and categorize projects over $10 million according to social and
environmental impact, and to require their borrowers to (2) conduct impact
assessments, (3) use International Finance Corporation (IFC) standards in such
assessments, (4) develop plans for managing the associated risks, (5) engage in
consultations with, and provide disclosure to, stakeholders, (6) establish a grievance
procedure, (7) secure independent review of the project assessment in higher risk
projects, (8) covenant to comply with applicable host country laws, IFC standards,
disclosure and decommissioning procedures, and (9) secure independent monitoring of
risky projects over the life of the loan. (10) In addition, the EPFIs themselves agree to
report at least once a year on their EP practices and experience. Like many initiatives of
this sort, the EPs contain a disclaimer to the effect that they concern internal
procedures of the participants, and do not create rights or binding obligations.81
Nevertheless, the mechanism hinges on a mix of organizational practices and a network
of enforceable contractual commitments, which the EPFIs pledge to extract from their
counterparties.
Membership has grown from ten EPFIs in 2003, to 7382 at this writing, which accounts
for over 70% of all international project financing in the developing world. In 2010, the
EPFIs formed the EP Association, a “soft,” unincorporated grouping of all member
institutions, which operates under a set of rules promulgated by the membership.
Subject-matter working groups are coordinated by a fourteen-member Steering
Committee. A two-person EP Secretariat, based in the UK, staffs the Association on a
day-to-day basis. The EPs were revised in 2006 to incorporate new, more stringent IFC
standards, and are undergoing another round of revision following a strategic review in
2011. Release of the updated EPs has been postponed until mid-2012. 83
The EPs are an established example of soft law and new governance. They are among
the more institutionally developed initiatives of this sort. Several design features of the
EPs are worth noting in the context of Principles implementation:
• Financial Institutions as Principal Subjects and Law-Makers. The EPs originated as
pre-emptive self-governance among a core group of financial institutions, which
81

The Equator Principles, available at http://www.equator-principles.com/resources/equator_principles.pdf (last
visited February 12, 2012).
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This includes two “Associate Members” (JP Morgan Chase and Wells Fargo), which have adopted the EPs and abides
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See PRIZMA, Launch of Equator Principles III Delayed to July 2012 (Jan. 10, 2012) available at
http://prizmablog.com/2012/01/10/launch-of-equator-principles-iii-delayed-to-july-2012/.
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approached the IFC. EPFIs are both members and principal subjects of
regulation.
Adoption and Membership. The EPs contain bright-line criteria for adoption and
membership. Even though the EPs themselves are adopted voluntarily and do
not, by their terms, create rights in members or other stakeholders, the clear act
of joining, paying membership fees, and signing up to specific standards, serves
as a commitment and community-defining device.
Recruiting. Comprehensive coverage of the project finance industry is an explicit
objective of the EPs. Members, together with IFC representatives, actively
recruit new EPFIs, paying attention to country and regional representation.
Constituency Definition and Outreach. The EP consultation and governance
process expressly seeks to balance regional, sector, and interest group
representation. Project-specific consultation under the EPs should include a
broad range of stakeholders.
Elaboration and Adaptation. The EPs are regularly elaborated and periodically
revised, including most recently as part of a high-profile strategic review.
Subsidiary and interpretive documents and guides refine and augment the code.
Harmonized Disclosure and Reporting. The EPs mandate disclosure at multiple
levels of both the EPFIs and their borrowers, and promulgate standards for
disclosure to promote comparability.
Decentralized Dispute Resolution. There is no centralized dispute resolution or
binding interpretation process for the EPs. Each EPFI commits to require its
borrowers to establish project-specific and “culturally appropriate” grievance
procedures for the stakeholders.
Capacity Building. The EPs provide for a transitional period and technical
assistance for new members.
Linkages with “Hard” Law and Institutions. The EPs originated in bank
consultations with the IFC. They explicitly adopt IFC standards, as well as some
World Bank and OECD nomenclature, and advocate compliance with national
legislation where it equals or exceeds IFC standards. The EP Association is
continuously engaged with the relevant international organizations.
Branding. The “Equator Principles” name was designed to signal North-South
balance. Because so much of the payoff to EPFIs is reputational, the process has
a highly developed branding and public relations strategy, including a current
and generally informative website.

As with virtually all new governance initiatives, assessments of the EPs’ efficacy are
inconclusive. In one sense—membership and industry coverage—the EPs have been a
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resounding success. However, quantitative studies of development outcomes are few,
and those that exist supply no definitive answers. Some proponents claim that the EPs
have changed the behavior of large firms; however, even optimistic assessments note
that smaller firms lack the resources to comply.84 Critics stress the absence of a
demonstrable shift in environmental and social outcomes on the ground.85 In a detailed
qualitative study, one team of scholars has noted that participation in the EPs affects
firm culture at the EPFIs, and potentially promotes awareness and better practices
within these banks beyond their project finance portfolio.86 In this sense, EP banks have
the capacity to diffuse standards of responsibility both within the project finance
industry and elsewhere in the banks’ business. Nevertheless, this research also casts
doubt on the true sources and viability of the commitment pull: although the EPs are
expressly framed as bank risk management, most of the bankers interviewed were
ambivalent about the business case for the EPs, and justified participation in terms of
responding NGO pressure. Such findings echo stories of pre-emption, self-preservation,
and cosmetic compliance in other industries.

B. Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) emerged at about the same time
as the EPs, in 2003, with strong leadership of the UK authorities and NGOs, such as
Publish What You Pay Coalition. EITI promotes transparency and accountability in the
extractive industries through public disclosure of “all material oil, gas, and mining
payments” by firms to governments, and all material government revenues from oil,
gas, and mining companies. The focus of the six EITI Criteria appears to be even more
targeted and procedural than that of the EPs: it is all about disclosure. However, the
twelve EITI Principles articulate a much broader set of objectives, ranging from
sustainable development and responsible stewardship of natural resource wealth, to
improving public finance management and accountability.87
The structure of EITI is quite different from the EPs:
•

Governments as Subjects of Regulation. Although the overall framework is
expressly and emphatically “multi-stakeholder,” and includes major extractive
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See Christopher Langdon, The impact of the Equator Principles on mining and metals finance in emerging markets,
White & Case LLP (Mar. 2007).
85
See Nick Mathiason, Banks Attacked for Failures to Meet Equator Principles on Environment, The Guardian (Jan. 10,
2010).
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88
89

firms and civil society participation, the parties principally charged with
compliance are countries. EITI Countries are held responsible for the reporting of
firm payments in their jurisdiction, and creating structures for such reporting.
Private Firms as “Supporting Investors.” Private firms are invited to participate in
the EITI process by signing onto a statement of support, engaging in certain
publicity and outreach, and paying an annual fee of US$1,500; however,
“supporting” status does not trigger reporting requirements. According to the
EITI factsheet, supporting the initiative helps demonstrate investor compliance
with Principles 3 and 5 of the UN Principles for Responsible Investing.88
Other Supporters. Civil society organizations, industry associations, nonmember
countries, and international organizations may all become supporters of EITI. For
the most part, supporter status involves no or minimal undertakings.
Graduated Membership Structure. Countries must have at least a two and a half
year record of compliance with EITI criteria to qualify for full membership. This
structure can support capacity building, but also sanction non-compliance.
Regular reviews validate continued membership. Yemen and Madagascar have
had their membership suspended.
Emphasis on Tripartism. EITI explicitly requires tripartite governance of country
EITI participation, including governments, extractive firms, and civil society
representatives in ongoing consultations. In other words, EITI expressly aspires
to occupy the center of the Governance Triangle.
External Independent Evaluation. A team of independent consultants provided a
strategic evaluation of EITI in 2011.
Formal Corporate Structure, Funding and IO Linkages. The EITI is organized as a
nonprofit association in Norway. Since the mid-2000s, it has had a 20-member
Board, a Secretariat, and access to a multi-donor trust fund managed by the
World Bank. Most of its funding comes from member governments, supporting
firms, and NGOs; however, the Government of Norway provides fully 20% of the
fund.89 The Multi-Donor Trust Fund provides technical assistance to
implementing countries.
Global Conferences. The biennial EITI Global Conference is an important
component of EITI governance. The Board is appointed at the conferences.
During the conference, EITI also constituency meetings with countries, firms, and
civil society.
Further Linkages and Related Initiatives. The IMF has published a Guide to
Resource Revenue Transparency. The World Bank has published the Extractive

http://eiti.org/files/2009-11-23_How_to_Support_Investors[1].pdf
http://eiti.org/about/funding.
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Industry Review. In 2010, U.S. legislation mandated disclosure of extractionrelated payments by firms applying to register securities with the SEC.90
As with other case studies, academic empirical studies of EITI are hard to come by.
Country membership and supporter lists have grown, and now include major portions of
the global extractive industry. Liberia became the first country to expand EITI beyond
extractive industries, to include forest management. A strategic evaluation conducted
for EITI by independent consultants from Scanteam in 2011 has found that the initiative
has had some success in establishing tripartite governance and reporting mechanisms in
the member countries. However, according to the report, “[w]hile transparency has
improved, accountability does not appear to have changed much.” The reviewers
attribute the limited societal and global effects on the targeted focus of the initiative,
weak institutions in member countries, limited linkages and a lack of a broader vision for
how improved reporting would leverage social change.91 NGO critics are less charitable.
According to Oxfam America, there is a "yawning gap" between the actions and rhetoric
of oil companies supporting EITI.92 Other argue that EITI shields companies from
criticism while they fight disclosure rules on extraction-related payments by the U.S.
securities regulators.93 NGOs have also criticized national EITI chapters for failing to live
up to the initiative’s transparency standards.94
An academic synthesis of implementation assessments acknowledges EITI’s
shortcomings, while pointing out that some of the development impacts of
transparency would be hard to measure.95 On the other hand, the authors note design
failures that reduce constituent ownership and with it, development impact. For
example, countries’ EITI disclosure appears to be geared disproportionately to external
audiences. Domestic constituents have scant economic, technical, and political capacity
to process and use the information generated from EITI.
It appears that the focus on government-led implementation at a minimum makes it
difficult to assess the effect of EITI on the behavior of private actors. The international
prominence of the initiative has contributed to its external focus, which in turn
potentially reduces domestic ownership. However, to the extent the primary concern of
the initiative is public finance reform and accountability, rather than reform of a
90
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broader set of extractive industry and development practices, it may be unfair to hold
EITI responsible for the limited or uncertain effect it has had on the industry.

C. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness
Unlike the initiatives in the preceding case studies, which sought to affect to varying
measures the behavior of both public and private actors, the 2005 Paris Declaration is a
purely intergovernmental undertaking, albeit one that invites civil society participation.
The Declaration comprises five fundamental principles of aid effectiveness: ownership
by recipient countries, alignment of the donors and use of local systems, harmonization
of procedures and information-sharing among donors, a focus on measurable
development results, and mutual accountability of donors and recipients for such
results. Flowing from these principles, the Declaration provides for over fifty
commitments, monitored by twelve indicators. The Accra High Level Forum adopted an
Agenda for Action in 2008 to accelerate the implementation of the Declaration. This
timing proved challenging with the onset of the global financial crisis, which strained aid
resources.
The Paris Declaration’s use of tiered, open-ended principles elaborated in ongoing
consultation and evaluation procedures, generally administered under the auspices of
the OECD’s Development Co-Operation Directorate, recalls familiar soft law and new
governance forms. Invocation of mutual accountability and collaborative program
development is also consistent with the paradigm. However, the initiative essentially
uses existing inter-governmental and institutional channels to promote improved aid
effectiveness.
OECD-led assessments of the Declaration’s impact show progress in establishing and
reforming recipient country institutions for policy development and aid
administration.96 There is also some evidence of increased aid volumes. However, an
independent audit completed in 2011 suggests that changes on the donor end have
been very limited.97 Whether this is a structural deficiency or a function of the crisis is
difficult to assess at this time.
It is also too early to draw lessons from the Paris Declaration for implementation of the
Principles. Although the Declaration has articulated ambitious goals, and has proceeded
to elaborate them in successive meetings, it did not emphasize institutional innovation
in the way the more hybrid public-private initiatives have done.
96
97

OECD, Aid Effectiveness 2005-2010: Progress in Implementing the Paris Declaration (2011).
The Evaluation of the Paris Declaration, Phase 2, Final Report (2011).
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D. The Santiago Principles98
The Generally Accepted Principles and Practices for Sovereign Wealth Funds, unveiled in
Santiago, Chile, in August 2008 (hence Santiago Principles), are essentially a public
sector initiative like the Paris Declaration. However, the Santiago Principles bring
together very different kinds of government actors—international investment vehicles
of surplus countries—and for a very different purpose than the traditional aid
enterprise.
State-owned investment vehicles or Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) proliferated in the
mid-2000s, but also faced an increasingly hostile investment environment in Europe and
the United States. At the outset, many SWFs saw one another as competitors and were
not inclined to collaborate. The idea of a best practices code emerged in G-20
discussions in 2007, and received a boost from the development of academic,
commercial, and think tank assessments of the SWFs.99 The goal was to improve
transparency and accountability of the SWFs, and thereby to make them seem less
threatening to the host countries. Because SWF sponsors had no need for official
funding, conditionality was not available as a lever to change individual SWF behavior.
Any resulting code would have to be “soft,” or nonbinding. Members of the
International Working Group (IWG) refrained from describing their work product as
“best” practices—but rather as generally accepted practices suitable for countries
across the national income spectrum.100 The IMF was invited to facilitate the
development of the principles and serve as the initial IWG secretariat based on its
macroeconomic and technical expertise, without explicit program or surveillance links.
Participants in the development of the Santiago Principles over the first half of 2008
report that a community of interests gradually emerged among disparate SWFs.
The two dozen Santiago Principles address the structure and objectives of SWFs (“legal,
institutional and macroeconomic” factors), their governance practices (especially
decision autonomy from the home government) and their investment and risk
management policies, focusing on financial stability. The document is suffused with
accountability rhetoric, which is cited in support of all but a few of the two dozen
principles. At the same time, the Santiago Principles take a particular view of
accountability that is distinct from earlier public statements by SWF and host
governments: SWFs promise to act and be accountable as market actors, not political
98

Portions of this section were previously published in Anna Gelpern, Sovereignty, Accountability, and the Wealth
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entities. They go the farthest in answering to their narrow stakeholders under the terms
of their constitutive arrangements,101abiding by the laws their hosts made applicable to
similarly situated investors,102 and participating in the global financial markets in the
manner of profit-driven private investors.103 The most significant disclosure is made to
the owner, not the domestic public, effectively relying on general government channels
to inform the populace and the world at large.104 Domestic political sensitivities
trumped transparency in important instances: for example, SWFs are not required to
disclose the size of their asset holdings.105
Because the objective of SWFs was to demonstrate their commercial essence despite
their public ownership, the Santiago Principles seek to distance the signatories from the
social responsibility agenda: SWFs are in the business of maximizing “risk-adjusted
returns” and operate solely “based on economic and financial grounds”. Any social,
ethical or religious motive is a deviation from the group norm (albeit one in which some
important members like Kuwait and Norway engage), which must be specifically
disclosed. Disclosure obligations elsewhere in the document are justified in terms of
dispelling “concern about potential noneconomic or nonfinancial objectives.”106 The
funds’ contribution to global financial stability comes not of a sense of public duty, but
rather of their capacity—by virtue of their economic objective and structure—“to take a
long-term view in their investments and ride out business cycles.”107
When IWG announced agreement on the Santiago Principles, its members were at pains
to disassociate them from the IMF surveillance process: they insisted that everything
about the principles was voluntary. Perhaps as a matter of preemption, the Santiago
Principles incorporated a periodic internal review mechanism.108 In theory, nothing
prevents the IMF from considering GAPP criteria in its assessment of home and host
policies implicating SWFs, just as nothing prevents a host government from using GAPP
as part of its investment screen.109 But doing so may undermine the Principles’
101
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legitimacy in the home countries, and scuttle cooperation between new and old powers
and institutions.
Shortly after releasing the principles themselves, the IWG secretariat released a SWF
survey, answering calls for transparency while seizing initiative and asserting control in a
field where authoritative information was scarce and analysis was dominated by private
investment banks and consultancies.110 Six months after presenting the Principles to the
IMFC, the group released the Kuwait Declaration establishing a standing forum of SWFs.
IWG’s successor, the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IFSWF) is “a
voluntary group of SWFs” whose membership is open to funds that meet the GAPP
definition of SWF and, significantly, “endorse” the Principles. It is a soft institutional
counterpart to the emphatically soft law of the Santiago Principles.111 The IFSWF has
met periodically in member capitals, has issued statements advocating open
investment, and has brokered a code of “good practices” on investment risk
management, conducting member surveys as part of the process.112
The following features of the Santiago Principles process merit attention for purposes of
Principles Implementation:
•

•

•

Membership Criteria. In the case of SWFs more than any other, a common
definition of regulatory subjects was missing—SWFs were just too diverse and
contested as a phenomenon. Defining the category, and requiring members to
formally endorse the Santiago Principles as a condition of joining, established a
community, a code of behavior, and a sanction113 in one step. This is similar to
the concepts of EPFIs and EITI Member Countries.
Common Defense Motive. Diverse SWFs were ultimately prodded into
cooperation by common fears about protectionist laws in host countries. The
code is unlikely to have emerged without this background risk.
Elaboration, Reporting, and Institutionalization. The initial code of behavior was
quickly supplemented by information release and more inward-looking best
practice efforts for the benefit of SWF members.

available at http://financialservices.house.gov/press110/press0313082.shtml; TRUMAN, THREAT OR SALVATION, supra
note 19, at 100.
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Sovereign Wealth Funds: Current Institutional and Operational Practices (Sep. 15, 2008), available at http://iwgswf.org/pubs/swfsurvey.pdf. SETSER REPORT, supra note 9, at 40 (noting a decline in transparency).
111
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•

•

•

Limited Emphasis on Disclosure and Civil Society Collaboration. In one important
respect, the Santiago Principles are unlike other new governance initiatives.
Although transparency and SWF-host collaboration are important objectives, the
funds’ commitment to these goals is carefully circumscribed owing in large part
to domestic political constraints. Civil society participation and social
consciousness are de-emphasized.
Involving International Organizations as Facilitators. The IMF’s role in the
Santiago Principles process may be akin to UNCTAD’s role in the preparation of
the Principles.
Role of Non-Governmental Monitors. The presence and continued reporting by
think tanks and industry observers contributed to the content and
implementation of the Santiago Principles. There is ample evidence of
competing outside metrics influencing the content of the Santiago Principles, of
SWFs tracking and seeking to improve their “scores” (sometimes by lobbying the
scorekeepers), and trying to preempt outside monitoring by supplying their own
information.

The Santiago Principles implementation record is limited—they are just over three years
old. However, judging by outside assessments, many SWFs have improved their
disclosure to varying degrees in the process of negotiation and early implementations.
Because SWFs’ objectives are limited and commercial, they also face a lower assessment
bar than the development-focused initiatives discussed in the three preceding case
studies.

E.

Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring

The Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in the Emerging
Markets (Emerging Markets Principles) were developed under the auspices of the
Institute for International Finance in 2004, partly responding the controversy
surrounding Argentina’s debt crisis in 2001 and the ensuing debate about sovereign
bankruptcy and sovereign debt contract reform. Like the EPs and the Santiago
Principles, the Emerging Market Principles were adopted partly as “market selfdefense”: large issuers and creditors felt threatened by the prospect of a statutory
sovereign bankruptcy regime, but were amenable to a code of conduct, especially if
adopting it would help defeat the bankruptcy proposal.114
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The Emerging Markets Principles exhibit the familiar characteristics of soft law and new
governance: they are nonbinding, open-ended and specified over time, and designed to
secure parallel undertakings from borrowers and creditors. They only apply to a subset
of countries and instruments, and are thus considerably narrower in scope and have
fewer constituents than the Principles for Responsible Lending and Borrowing.
The Emerging Markets Principles have four basic prongs: transparency and timely flow
of information, debtor-creditor cooperation to avoid restructuring, good-faith actions,
and fair treatment. At the outset, they were adopted by major financial institutions and
supported by emerging markets borrowers. Elements of the official sector, including the
G-20 and the International Monetary and Financial Committee of the IMF, have “noted”
and “welcomed” the Emerging Markets Principles, but have stopped short of robust
endorsement.
The Principles Consultative Group (PCG), comprising 31 representatives of sovereign
borrowers and leading financial institutions, meets periodically as the governance organ
of the Emerging Markets Principles. The Group of Trustees of the Principles, comprising
“elder statesmen” in sovereign finance consider the overall development of the
Emerging Markets Principles in the context of the international financial system, and
may recommend modifications. The Institute for International Finance (IIF) (an industry
group representing large financial institutions) was the leading force behind the
Emerging Market Principles and serves as the secretariat. While other financial industry
groups have indicated co-sponsorship and support for the Emerging Market Principles,
none are as vocal in proclaiming their relevance. In the run-up to publication and since,
there have been reports of dissent within financial industry ranks with respect to the
content and application of the principles.115
Like the other initiatives considered here, the Emerging Markets Principles come with
periodic reporting and self-assessment, elaboration and refinement by the PCG, staffed
by the IIF. Unlike some of the others, the Emerging Markets Principles have a discrete
view of their constituents: major financial institutions and governments in major
emerging market countries. Like the Santiago Principles, the Emerging Markets
Principles do not aspire to civil society participation, or a broader social reform agenda.
Nor have there been large-scale independent audits of the sort more developmentfocused initiatives, such as EITI, have undergone.
Critics of the initiative point to the prominent role of IIF, infighting and defections
among private creditor constituents, and the apparently provisional engagement by
115
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both the developing countries and the official sector, as evidence that the Emerging
Markets Principles are unlikely to succeed on their own relatively circumscribed
terms.116 At this writing, the Emerging Markets Principles are being tested in Greece,
where the IIF has taken the lead in negotiating on behalf of private creditors, and has
invoked the Emerging Markets Principles.
The Emerging Markets Principles initiative can claim the largest measure of success in
fostering professionalized ex-ante debt management, such as establishment of debt
management offices and improving disclosure practices among emerging markets
countries. It is difficult to tell to what extent these changes might have happened absent
the Emerging Markets Principles.

***
This Part has surveyed five case studies of soft law and new governance initiatives in
development finance. The key insight is that while all five are informal and nonbinding,
they take rather different institutional forms, which may in turn help predict or explain
their performance. To be fair, none of the five can boast a deep record of
implementation, especially as measured by development outcomes on the ground.
The Equator Principles appear to have a robust infrastructure for engaging direct
participants in project finance, and the tightest link between the professed goals and
the methods used to achieve them. The EP initiative has a discrete set of objectives, is
controlled by the primary subjects of regulation (EPFIs) and benefits from private
contract enforcement and linkages to the IFC, which supplies the content of the
standards. On the other hand, placing financial institutions at the center of the initiative
and relying on contractual mechanisms for stakeholder access and public awareness
potentially raises the risk of capture. IFC’s orchestration role becomes more important
in this context.117
The EITI has a more formal and elaborate structure than the EPs, and a more formal
connection with the official sector. However, its emphasis on government accountability
to govern public and private actors, the indirect commitment of the private extractive
116
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industry, as well as the gap between the immediate objective of disclosure and the
larger goals of development, creates risks for implementation. On the other hand,
independent and public audits and information dissemination practices create
incentives for public monitoring, even in the absence of direct obligations on nongovernment stakeholders.
The Paris Declaration is the case study closest to the “old governance” model: it has
articulated ambitious goals on aid effectiveness, but has largely eschewed radical
institutional innovation in pursuing them. Even so, it has helped secure important
improvements in recipient aid management despite relatively weak performance on the
part of the donors.
Like the EPs, the Santiago Principles benefit from a delimited constituency, narrowly set
goals, and the perception of business risk. The Santiago Principles do not aspire to
change the world, but to make it safe for SWF investment. The most interesting element
of this initiative for Principles implementation is the role of outside indices and
scoreboards, which became an important foil and driver of the Santiago Principles.
The Emerging Markets Principles similarly do not set ambitious development policy
goals. They may have played a role in improving ex ante debt management and
monitoring on the part of emerging market countries; however, their effect on debt
restructuring practices is uncertain. Their close association with a subset of creditors
have exposed them to criticism for limited legitimacy.
In conclusion, it is worth considering a much older initiative, which culminated in the
2003 UN Convention on Corruption. Beginning with the enactment of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act in the United States in 1977, U.S. officials tried to persuade
counterparts to adopt similar measures, so as not to put U.S. firms at a disadvantage.
However, such efforts largely failed. The campaign got a new life with the formation of
Transparency International (TI) in 1993, based in Germany, which began with promoting
transparency pacts between governments and bidders for public contracts, and
expanded to monitoring and rating countries for public corruption indicators. U.S.
negotiators had given up on securing hard law commitments on bribery; however, they
enthusiastically supported TI’s soft law campaign. The civil society campaign led to a
series of soft law instruments (guidelines and recommendations) promulgated by the
OECD, a formal international organization, followed by classic hard law—the 1997 OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention. Scholars credit the strategic, purposeful collaboration and
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iterative process between state and civil society actors with the success of the effort in
changing domestic legislation and norms of behavior in many jurisdictions.118
Echoes of this “hardening” trajectory may be found in some of the case studies in this
part, including the incorporation of EITI concerns in the Dodd-Frank Act and national
legislation in Liberia and Nigeria. However, one must be cautions in implying a necessary
and unidirectional relationship between soft and hard law from this case: while some
scholars have emphasized complementarity between soft and hard initiatives, others
have shown ways in which states and market participants can play soft law and hard law
against each other, weakening both in the process.119 With these lessons in mind, the
next Part contains recommendations for Principles implementation.

Part III: An “All of the Above” Implementation Strategy
The central premise of this paper has been that the goal of implementation goes beyond
formal adoption or widespread endorsement. Implementation of the Principles should
be measured by compliance: a drop in unsustainable, unauthorized, and exploitative
sovereign debt. Compliance here may take years, sometimes decades, to ascertain. This
fact should not detract from the overarching goal. It does raise distinct implementation
challenges and tempers expectations of assessment. None of the initiatives discussed in
the case studies in Part II can claim to have developed a robust record of compliance in
the course of the past decade.120
The implementation recommendations that follow draw on the theories of soft law and
new governance sketched out in Part I, and on the case studies in Part II. They fall into
three categories: endorsement and membership, monitoring and information flow, and
institutional linkages. More specifically, the implementation strategy should (i) maintain
the nonbinding character of the Principles; (ii) secure clear endorsement from diverse
constituents, with diversity measured both geographically, and by sector (states,
financial firms, civil society), (ii) continue to elaborate and adapt the Principles to build
support; (iv) promote regular monitoring and publicly accessible reporting, using both
internal and external mechanisms; (v) forge institutional links with multiple stakeholders
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and connections to other best practices regimes; and (iv) create a governance body to
maintain oversight, review and adapt the Principles, reinforce ties with stakeholders,
and potentially administer membership sanctions. I elaborate below.

First, it makes little sense to turn the Principles into a treaty instrument. Especially to
the extent they reflect elements of existing law, their best promise lies in their capacity
to reach out to diverse audiences, expand the consensus, and adapt to fast-changing
circumstances. This feature would be lost to a multi-year process of treaty negotiation,
with membership and compliance highly uncertain in the end. Moreover, even where a
treaty is in place, remedies for breach may be inaccessible, uncertain or ineffective. This
stands in contrast to the general viability of retaliation in trade. Recent literature
suggests that soft law has had success in the realm of international financial regulation
when it engages new governance techniques; there is untapped potential for both soft
law and new governance in sovereign debt.
Second, formal adoption or endorsement of the Principles by governments, G-groups,
international financial institutions, civil society and private creditor groups, contract
counterparties, and others, is important, but not sufficient. It would of course be useful
to have all the stakeholders formally adopt the Principles. Adoption creates a
community of interest, channels for information exchange and moral suasion, and
ultimately reputational sanctions for not complying with group norms. However,
adoption does not correlate perfectly with compliance, and may even mask
noncompliance. Selective adoption and implementation of the Principles may be a way
to jump-start endorsements; however, it is also fraught with risks of dilution and
fragmentation. In particular, it is important to get broad-based buy-in on what
constitutes the substantive core of the Principles, which should be protected from
variation to the extent possible, even at a cost to formal participation. One possible way
to reconcile the need for endorsement now and the strength of commitment down the
line is to “tier” elements of the Principles, much like some of the initiatives in Part II: a
general and rarely-changed core could be adopted up front, with more specific
implications to be further developed by the participants.
Third, the Principles would benefit from substantive and technical elaboration over
time. This process can be used to broaden acceptance of the Principles and keep them
relevant. For example, if a group of experts from different jurisdictions prepared a
report on how sovereign debt contracts or debt management practices might better
reflect the goals of the Principles, this would create an implementation vehicle,
demonstrate ongoing vitality of the Principles project, and secure ownership in an
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important constituency. Export credit and development agencies, and national debt
management offices, are key constituents that could contribute to elaboration, fostering
ownership. Other practical reports could address subjects such as interpreting sovereign
fiduciary duty across jurisdictions, due diligence and post-disbursement monitoring,
domestic legislative implications, the role of the judiciary in implementing the Principles,
a “best practices bank,” and even debt data collection. Preserving the open and
contested character of the Principles is important to continue generating new
implementation ideas, and new opportunities for broad-based buy in. The process of
elaboration should be open, with reports publicly available and inviting public comment.
Ultimately, the elaboration process may consider whether the Principles should harden,
and if so, in what form. Elaboration may take place in multiple stakeholder settings; it
may also be centralized in a multi-stakeholder governance forum. Where it is
decentralized, coordination is key.
Fourth, monitoring is an essential component of Principles implementation. Apart from
promoting accountability, monitoring and reporting may help create positive feedback
loops: better due diligence, better risk-management systems, and more generally, a
“race to the top” among borrowers, lenders, and monitors. For monitoring to be
effective, it must be user-friendly and relevant both to external and internal
constituents. It would help to develop specific compliance benchmarks. Three forms of
monitoring could be useful; they are not mutually exclusive. Public monitoring and
reporting by civil society groups specifically referencing the Principles and any relevant
elaboration would promote public accountability and diffusion of the Principles.
Facilitating and encouraging such monitoring would put pressure on governments to
disclose more, especially with respect to direct and contingent liabilities, and the terms
of their debt contracts. At least one dedicated independent monitor with periodic (at
least annual) reporting duties to the consultative group, UNCTAD, and/or another organ,
would promote better governance for the Principles.
The role of competition in monitoring should be actively considered. Multiple private
sector, NGO, and public monitors, at least at the outset, can contribute to improved
assessment standards, create broader demand for regulation and information. It is not
necessary to decide at the outset on a single rating or compliance certification process.
Single compliance metrics would be particularly difficult to articulate in sovereign
finance, as distinct from the more traditional context of supply-chain certification. A
multi-layered assessment, akin to the SWF scoreboard, would be more appropriate.
Fifth, institutional and operational linkages can help promote durable compliance. For
example, incorporating the Principles into the monitoring agenda of existing groups and
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institutions, cross-referencing and linking to other best practices in public and private
instruments, would help support wider acceptance the Principles. Embedding the
Principles among the standards monitored by international organizations such as the
IMF, the FSB, sector and regional groupings, and bilateral creditors, would leverage
existing institutional competence to support implementation. In forging such linkages, it
is important to engage all relevant stakeholders and create meaningful expectations for
their respective roles.
Sixth, a dedicated institutional framework for the Principles, soft or hard, would help
coordinate the monitoring and elaboration functions discussed earlier, entrench
constituencies for implementation, and embed the Principles in the fabric of sovereign
lending and borrowing practice. Institutionalizing broad-based consultations, even after
the Principles are substantially fleshed out, should enhance buy-in and ultimately help
boost compliance. It bears emphasis that all of the initiatives discussed in Part II came to
establish a governance body, some more formal than others, within a few years of their
launch. At the outset, a rotating advisory group including representatives of sovereign
borrowers, official and private creditors, and civil society, would support the continuing
legitimacy and relevance of the Principles. Such a group could oversee the elaboration,
adaptation, and refinement. It may make sense to consider two distinct advisory groups:
one for lenders, the other for borrowers. Splitting the groups might better channel
expertise; on the other hand, it would detract from the valuable holistic character of the
Principles, and would require an additional coordination framework. Other institutional
forms to consider include a secretariat and a periodic general meeting. These would be
in addition to the advisory body. If the Principles enjoy any measure of success,
questions of interpretation, standards, membership sanctions, and eventual
“hardening” may come up. It would be useful to consider up front a framework for
handling such questions.

Conclusion
This paper has discussed strategies for implementation of the Principles, along with
theoretical and pragmatic grounds for the proposed implementation path. These are
anchored in the particular qualities of the Principles. The Principles are distinctly
ambitious for trying to govern both debtor and creditor practices, including public and
private creditors, covering a broad range of instruments, and actively involving civil
society stakeholders. This is ultimately a key source of strength for the principles: they
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would likely be seen as even-handed, and therefore more legitimate. The true
constituency of the Principles is the global economic system. Properly implemented,
they should promote stability and equity within it.
The Principles are also a product of broad-based consultations with diverse government,
private sector, multilaterals, and civil society groups. Formal and informal outreach adds
to the input legitimacy of the Principles, especially as the content is elaborated and
made more specific. The diversity of constituents for the Principles presents an
additional process opportunity. The Principles may be “tested” in discrete fields, where
they could demonstrate their utility and win broader adherence based on experience.
The presence of multiple constituencies presents opportunities for targeted outreach,
where proponents may emphasize the Principles’ utility to such constituencies, and
ultimately, the shared interest in compliance.
The Principles are a mix of well-established principles of national and international law,
and an effort at systematization and progressive development of international law
governing sovereign lending and borrowing. The Principles do not claim to make new
law, but rather to harness and elaborate existing best practices and general principles.
Done right, the process of adaptation can create buy-in at the national level at
moderate political cost.
By charting both ex-ante and ex-post debt management practices, the Principles frame a
comprehensive debt management regime that enhances financial stability. By focusing
on due diligence, transparency, and authority, the Principles contribute to crisis
prevention. The emphasis on disclosure should facilitate constructive operation of
market mechanisms at all stages of the process. Finally, by clarifying the locus and
standards of responsibility, the Principles contribute to sound management of debt
distress.
All that said, a strategy emphasizing soft law and new governance is by definition
uncertain: success is a function of active and purposeful engagement by the
participants, some of whom may have limited incentives cooperate beyond cosmetic
compliance. Political buy-in, technical and financial resources are hard to come by, and
constant revision is burdensome. Nevertheless, none of the “hard” alternatives by itself
can ensure implementation. A parallel-track process with thought-out linkages among
the tracks stands the best chance of changing borrowing and lending behavior—along
with outcomes for development and financial stability.
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